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Patent Working Requirements:
Historical and Comparative Perspectives
Marketa Trimble*
At the beginning of the twentieth century, commentators referred to
patent working requirements as the most contentious contemporary concept
in patent law, and working requirements were at the center of discussions
about revisions to the Paris Convention. By the end of the twentieth century
it seemed that working requirements attracted less attention; the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ( TRIPS) did not
expressly mention working requirements at all. However, some TRIPS
provisions do arguably relate to such requirements; in fact, some
commentators believe that the TRIPS Agreement prevents countries from
maintaining such requirements, at least in some forms. Although the lack
of interest in working requirements might suggest that the requirements are
no longer important, national patent systems continue to struggle with the
question reflected in the requirements: whether the rights of a patent owner
should be limited (and if so, under what conditions) when the patent owner
does not practice his invention at all, or does not practice it sufficiently.
This Article discusses the origins and development of patent working
requirements and examines the rationales for, and purposes of, the
requirements. This Article points out the links and interactions between
working requirements and the other components of patent systems and shows
that all of the components, including working requirements, serve to calibrate
the systems to the particular needs of individual countries, including the needs
of their complex legal systems. To the extent that international patent law
harmonization continues to allow some leeway for countries to calibrate their
national patent systems according to their differing national needs, and to
the extent that international law has not foreclosed countries’ rights to
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introduce and maintain working requirements, countries should use working
requirements to best serve the purposes of their own patent systems.
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INTRODUCTION
A patent working requirement (“working requirement”) is a component of
many, though not all, national patent systems. A working requirement is a provision
of a national patent statute that states that an owner of a patent must practice his or
her patented invention (i.e., to manufacture or import the invention) within the
country that granted the patent. Many variations of the requirement exist among
the diverse national patent systems, and the various national requirements have
evolved over time. Countries have differed, and continue to differ, in their
definitions of a sufficient working of a patent and the proper territorial scope of
the working of a patent, the circumstances under which they will excuse the
nonworking of a patent, the period they mandate as the period within which the
working must occur, and the sanctions that they will impose for the nonworking of
a patent.1 This Article discusses the history and features of patent working
requirements from a comparative perspective and suggests that patent working
requirements not be evaluated in isolation, but only in the context of the national
patent systems in which they operate.
Working requirements have been the subject of negotiations on international
patent cooperation since the nineteenth century, but interest in the requirements

1. For comparative literature on patent working requirements from different periods, see, for
example, ALFRED CARPMAEL & EDWARD CARPMAEL, PATENT LAWS OF THE WORLD: COLLECTED,
EDITED, AND INDEXED (William Clowes & Sons 2d ed., rev. 1889); DAVID FULTON, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGNS, WITH A DIGEST OF COLONIAL AND
FOREIGN PATENT LAWS 167–246 ( Jordan & Sons 17th ed. 1894); ADOLF KRAETZER, DER
AUSFÜHRUNGSZWANG IM PATENTRECHT (1910); STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 425–29 (H ARVARD
UNIV. PRESS 1975); K. SCHROETER & R. POSCHENRIEDER, DER AUSÜBUNGSZWANG IN DER
PATENTGESETZGEBUNG ALLER LÄNDER (M. Millenet 1934); JAN VOJÁČEK, A SURVEY OF THE
PRINCIPAL NATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS 59–63 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1936); Thomas Cottier, Shaheeza
Lalani & Michelangelo Temmerman, Use It or Lose It: Assessing the Compatibility of the Paris
Convention and TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Local Working Requirements, 17 J. INT ’L
ECON. L. 437, 461–71 (2014); Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, Verschärfter Ausübuingszwang für
Patente? GRUR INT ’ L 234, 352 (1981); Bernard Olcott, Realistic Aspects of Working Foreign Patents,
45 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’ Y 315 (1963); Nicholas A. Vonneuman, Conditionally Exclusive Patent Rights and
the Patent Clause of the Constitution, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 397–407 (1956).

Trimble_First to Printer (Do Not Delete)

2016]

PATENT WORKING REQUIREMENTS

5/21/2017 11:37 AM

485

has fluctuated over time.2 Today, two factors fuel an interest in working
requirements: First, working requirements have been considered and used as a
means through which developing and least-developed countries might mitigate
some of the negative effects of the increased level of patent protection that these
countries introduced under the pressure of international harmonization. Second,
working requirements have attracted the attention of scholars who seek tools to
combat the phenomenon of undesirable patent enforcement practices in the United
States by the so-called patent assertion entities, who often, though not always, are
nonpracticing entities3—entities that do not practice the patents that they strive to
enforce.4 Because current U.S. patent law does not include a general patent working
requirement per se,5 commentators have examined other national patent laws for
examples of, and models for, such a requirement.6 This Article complements the
existing literature on working requirements by providing insights into the larger
context in which national versions of patent working requirements have evolved.
This Article does not attempt to determine whether patent working
requirements in general, or in any particular permutations, comply with the TRIPS
Agreement7 or other obligations that countries may have. Some commentators
believe that the TRIPS Agreement requires that countries abolish or amend their
working requirements; the TRIPS Agreement does not specifically address working
2. LADAS, supra note 1, at 519–20; EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 45–57 (1951).
3. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 809 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
4. E.g., Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs):
A Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (2015) (proposing a working
requirement); Daniel Tagliente, Shooting Blanks: The Ineffectiveness of the Executive Branch’s Entrance
into the Great Patent Troll Hunt, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 311 (2015) (advocating for a
working requirement). These are not the first instances in which commentators have discussed the
possibility and desirability of introducing working requirements into the U.S. patent system. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM OLDFIELD, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF PATENT LAWS: TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 23417,
H.R. REP. NO. 62-1161 (1912); Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT ’ L L. & BUS. 666, 673 (1988); Timothy W. Hagan & Steven
J. Henry, Is a Compulsory Licensing Statute Necessary? A Study of the U.S. and Foreign Experience,
7 LAW & POL’Y INT ’ L BUS. 1207 (1975); Floyd W. Vaughan, Suppression and Non-Working of
Patents, with Special Reference to the Dye and Chemical Industries, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 693, 700 (1919).
5. See infra notes 26–28. On the one period during which the working requirement was imposed
in the United States, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
6. Some proposals are not for working requirements, but have features that resemble such
requirements. E.g., Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 977, 1002, 1002 n.83 (1977); Amanda Frye, “Inextricably
Commingled”: A Restitution Perspective in Patent Remedies, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 669, 692–93 (2013);
John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2155 (2007); Mark
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Oskar
Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1062
(2015); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not To Use in Property and Patent Law, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1451 (2013); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing:
Could A Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1351, 1357 (2013); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345 (2010).
7. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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requirements but includes provisions that some commentators interpret as
prohibiting or limiting such requirements.8 Whether or not this interpretation is
correct is open to discussion.9 The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
between the United States and Brazil that concerned a working requirement was
settled, and therefore the case, which could have clarified whether the requirements
comply with the TRIPS Agreement, produced no binding opinion on the issue.10
This Article argues that to the extent that international obligations do not
currently prevent, or will not prevent in the future, countries from introducing and
maintaining patent working requirements, countries should use the requirements
where necessary and appropriate to calibrate their national patent systems to best
serve their needs. Needs, in this context, are not only the economic and social needs
of individual countries, which certainly shape the goals pursued in national patent
laws; access to medicines, for example, and other policy goals might be of greater
concern in some countries more than in others. It is upon individual countries to
defend their interests when they negotiate and enter into international obligations.11
Other needs include the structural needs of countries’ legal systems; one legal
system might operate with an internal consistency that requires certain components
of the patent system to be shaped in one particular manner to achieve the goals of
the system, while the same components might be ineffective or superfluous for the
achievement of the same goals in another national legal system. Therefore, some
countries might address the nonworking of patents by employing different
components of their legal systems, while other countries, also to address the
nonworking of patents—and to avoid a substantial overhaul of their legal systems—
might rely on working requirements to achieve the same end.
This Article begins first with an overview of the history of patent working
requirements, highlighting the features of their developments in the national laws
of various countries and also in international patent law negotiations. Second, this
Article discusses the goals that patent working requirements were designed to
achieve; these goals have changed over time as countries rearrange the priorities of
their goals. Third, this Article analyzes the relationships between patent working
requirements and other components of national patent systems, and the interactions
of the patent working requirement with these other components.

8.
9.

NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 198 (2d ed. 2005).
See Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, DECLARATION ON PATENT
PROTECTION: REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER TRIPS 9–10, https://www.mpg.de/8132986/
Patent-Declaration.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
10. Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/1 ( June 8, 2000).
11. Whether countries actually can influence the result of international negotiations is a separate
question; many factors can determine or influence a country’s ability to defend its economic and social
needs in negotiations of international instruments on intellectual property law.
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The first working requirements implemented by countries were consistent
with the countries’ initial approaches to their patent systems, which were guided by
the notion that patents were expected to serve domestic industry.12 This notion led
some countries to discriminate against foreigners, for example, by denying them the
possibility to obtain patents. For instance, in the United States, there was a period
of time in which foreigners could not obtain a U.S. patent at all, or only with
difficulties.13
The practice of denying patents to foreigners largely began to disappear
starting in the mid-1800s; the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (“the Convention”)14 introduced the principle of national treatment, and
the 1911 revision of the Convention prohibited countries from requiring foreign
patentees to establish residence in a country as a condition of a patent grant by that
country.15 Nevertheless, many countries continue, as a remnant of the old practice,
to maintain provisions in their patent laws that show their preferences for patent
applicants to first file for a patent locally.16
The interest in promoting domestic industry also prompted countries to
impose a working requirement to ensure that the patented invention was practiced
locally. A patent owner who failed to work his patent in the country that granted
12. A German author commented on the English view of patent law in 1839: “England
justifiably views its patent law as a guarantee that no invention . . . will be lost for the country, but
instead it must contribute—and with all potential of which it is able—to the welfare and progress of
the domestic industry. In the recent years . . . progressive governments have adopted the same
opinion.” FRIEDRICH GEORG WIECK, GRUNDSÄTZE DES PATENTWESENS 6 (1839) (translation by
author). For the similar motivations of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, see Camilla A. Hrdy, State
Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez-Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 98 (2013).
13. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318, 321 (1793) (repealed 1836). Starting in
1800, however, patents could be granted to “[a]liens who at the time of petitioning . . . [for a patent]
resided for two years within the United States.” Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 1, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (1800)
(repealed 1836). The Act of 1832 also permitted an alien to petition for a patent if “[a]t the time of
petitioning for a patent, [the alien] shall be resident in the United States, and shall have declared his
intention, according to law, to become a citizen thereof.” Act of July 13, 1832, ch. 203, 4 Stat. 577, 577
(1832) (repealed 1836). In 1836, Congress repealed all previous patent laws, removing the limitations.
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6, 21, 5 Stat. 117, 119, 125 (1836) (repealing ch. 11, Act of Feb. 21, 1793;
ch. 25, Act of Apr. 17, 1800; ch. 203, Act of July 13, 1832) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-329 (1952)); see
also ALBERT HENRY WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 591, 597, 601, 604–05 (4th ed. 1904).
14. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1629,
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
15. Id. art. 2(2); GEORG HENDRIK CHRISTIAAN BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE
APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS
REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 31 (WIPO 2007).
16. Countries differ in their requirements of patent applicants to first apply locally for
patents based on the type of invention and the circumstances of the patent application. See, e.g., 35
U.S.C. § 184(a) (2012); Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Amending the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 20, 2008
Falü Huibian, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2011-02/15/content_1620619.htm [https://
perma.cc/8H74-Q2BE]; Patents Act 1977, c. 37, § 23 (UK).
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the patent faced a forfeiture of the patent, or later, when forfeiture was replaced by
compulsory licensing, a compulsory license for the patent.17 Working requirements
that were a manifestation of countries’ concerns for their domestic industry and also
a manifestation of the other goals of their national patent systems proved to be
much more durable than the provisions that denied patents to foreigners. The
working requirements, albeit with amendments, survived the Convention and its
several revisions and exist in many countries to this day.
The working requirement concept predates modern patent systems and
originates in the medieval privileges—royal patents that sometimes granted
privileges to foreigners who would teach their art to the country’s population. For
example, in a patent that Edward III granted in 1331 to Johannes Kempe from
Flanders, “the King promised similar privileges to all others who would settle in
Great Britain and Ireland, and teach their arts to those willing to learn.”18 It was
important for countries to see their local populations learn from the patent holder;
even if the patent holder left the country after the patent expired, the country could
continue to benefit from the newly acquired knowledge and skill.19 Later patents
provide evidence that the requirement was maintained, but also that it developed
over time:20 late sixteenth century English patents included a threat of invalidation
if the patent was not practiced, and an English patent from 1639 included a
requirement—notably consistent with later formulations of the working
requirement—that the patent be worked within three years, otherwise it would be
invalidated.21
After modern national patent systems had been created to protect inventions,
many of the systems imposed various versions of the working requirement at
different times. For example, U.S. law never required that U.S. nationals work their
patents, but for a short period of time from 1832 to 1836 the U.S. Patent Act did
include a working requirement for patent owners who were foreigners.22 Later,
when the existence of a patent working requirement was questioned in the context
17. See, e.g., Oesterreichisches Patentgesetz 1852 [Austrian Patent Act of 1852]
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL] § 3, reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTT, THE PATENT LAWS
OF ALL NATIONS: ALGERIA—TURKEY 15, 16 ( Washington, Charles R. Brodix 1886) [hereinafter
PATENT LAWS OF ALL NATIONS]; Octrooiwet [Patent Act] of May 24, 1854, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD
[B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 25, 1854, art. XXIII, reprinted in PATENT LAWS OF ALL
NATIONS at 46 [hereinafter Patent Act of Belgium]; Loi du 5 juillet 1844 sur les brevets d’invention
[Law of July 5, 1844 on Patents for Inventions], PÉRIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE [D.P. III], July 5, 1844,
art. 32(2) (Fr.), reprinted in PATENT LAWS OF ALL NATIONS at 190.
18. ERNEST LUNGE, COMPULSORY WORKING AND REVOCATION OF PATENTS 2 (1910).
19. Id. at 5.
20. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 2–3, 9, 138–39.
21. STEPHEN VAN DULKEN, BRITISH PATENTS OF INVENTION, 1617–1977: A GUIDE FOR
RESEARCHERS 41 (The British Library, 1999). For other early examples of working requirements, see
Frank I. Schechter, Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents Be Unconstitutional?, 22 VA. L. REV. 287,
299–304 (1936); Vonneuman, supra note 1, at 397–98, 401.
22. Act of July 13, 1832, ch. 203, 4 Stat. 577 (1832) (repealed 1836); see also Golden, supra note
6, at 2123 n.50. For attempts to reintroduce the working requirement for foreign patent owners, see
S. 1838, 67th Cong. (1921); S. 3325, 67th Cong. (1922).
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of equitable considerations, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908 confirmed that no
patent working requirement had existed in U.S. law since 1836. The Court
concluded that Congress knew of working requirements that existed in other
countries and consciously opted to adopt and maintain a different policy.23
Repeated attempts thereafter failed to introduce a general scheme for compulsory
licensing into U.S. patent law for nonworking.24 In 1988, Congress confirmed that
a refusal to license or use rights to a patent is not grounds for the denial of relief to
a patent owner for infringement; such a refusal is not sufficient to deem the refusal
an instance of patent misuse.25 While some components of the current U.S. patent
system encourage patent working,26 and provisions do exist for a limited
compulsory licensing of patents,27 the U.S. patent system does not include a general
patent working requirement per se.28
Given the original rationale for the working requirement, it is not surprising
that countries initially did not permit the working requirement to be satisfied
through an importation of goods. Instead, the working requirement mandated the
manufacturing of the goods in the country that granted the patent.29 But countries
relaxed their approach to importation as it became clear that not all patented
inventions could be—practicably or economically—manufactured locally. A
number of countries introduced a system of importation patents that permitted a
patent owner to import patented inventions from another country where the owner

23. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). On the “right not
to use” in general and the Continental Paper Bag decision in particular, see Liivak & Peñalver, supra
note 6, at 1444.
24. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386, 433 n.26, 433 n.27, clarified in 324 U.S. 570
(1945); Armin Herz, Compulsory Licensing, 28 J. PATENT OFFICE SOC’ Y 889 (1946); OLDFIELD, supra
note 4; Schechter, supra note 21, at 288–91. For examples of U.S. bills that included a working
requirement, see H.R. 9304, 81st Cong. (1950); S. 2491, 77th Cong. (1942); H.R. 6864, 75th
Cong. (1937); S. 3474, 69th Cong. (1926); S. 3297, 67th Cong. (1922); S. 1838, 67th Cong. (1921)
(foreign-owned patents); H.R. 19188, 63d Cong. (1914); H.R. 1700, 63d Cong. § 1 (1913); H.R. 23193,
62d Cong. § 17 (1912).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547–48,
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (discussing patents in exchange for disclosure rather than use).
26. U.S. law includes some provisions that incentivize patent working and de facto sanction
non-working. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2012); In the Matter of Certain Multimedia Display
and Navigation Devices and Sys., Components Thereof, and Prods. Containing Same, ITC, 337-TA694, July 22, 2011; Certain Optical Disc Drives, Components Thereof, & Prods. Containing Same,
ITC, 337-TA-897, July 17, 2014. For patent working in considerations of equitable remedies, see Foster
v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
27. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 2572 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 203
(2012) (march-in rights); 35 U.S.C. § 204 (2012) (preference for U.S. industry); 35 U.S.C. § 209(b) (2012)
(manufacture in the United States of licensed federally-owned inventions); Clean Air Amendments of
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)(6) (1970) (transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012)); Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2183 (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 167 (2012).
28. Two examples of post-1988 bills with working requirements are H.R. 4151, 103d
Cong. (1994) (for patents “of vital importance to the public health or welfare . . .”); H.R. 2927, 106th
Cong. (1999) (for patents that are necessary to “alleviate health or safety needs”).
29. Patent Act of Belgium, supra note 17, 38 fol., at 41.
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held a patent on the same invention;30 some of these countries issued these
importation patents only for inventions that were considered deserving of special
treatment because of the patented inventions’ importance.31 Later, some countries
entered into agreements that enlarged the territorial scope for patent working. Based
on these agreements, working in any of the countries-parties to an agreement
satisfied the working requirement in all the countries, which sometimes, although
not always, led to the importation of an invention from one of the countries into
another.32 And eventually, most countries recognized that the working requirement
could be satisfied through importation.33
From the beginnings of international negotiations on industrial property
protection, working requirements were a hotly debated topic, and international
negotiations turned to the appropriate remedy (vis-à-vis society) or sanction (vis-àvis the patent owner) for the nonworking of a patent. While at the 1873 Vienna
Conference the discussions concerned compulsory licensing as a remedy,34 at the
1878 Paris Conference the discussions turned away from compulsory licensing—
apparently because of the influence of the French delegation, which insisted that
compulsory licensing was contrary to the natural rights theory on which French
patent law had been built.35 Because compulsory licensing (imposed for any reason)
was interpreted as a potential violation of the absolute right to property that should
be enjoyed by the patent owner,36 expropriation of a patent in the public interest
was instead promoted as the only acceptable remedy in light of the theory.37
When the Paris Convention was signed in 1883, it stated that “the patentee
[was to] remain bound to work his patent in conformity with the laws of the country
into which he introduces the patented objects.”38 As for importation, the
Convention prohibited forfeiture as the sanction for the importation of a patented
invention, as long as the invention was manufactured in a country of the Paris Union

30. See PATENT LAWS OF ALL NATIONS, supra note 17, fol. 139 at 140–41. A similar provision
was included in the 1853 Patent Regulation of Sachsen but only in relation to the other states of the
German Union. Importation patents survived the Paris Convention, and in the 1970s, there were still
several countries that granted importation patents. See LADAS, supra note 1, at 375–77.
31. For instance, section 2 of the Patent Act of Bayern made it a condition for granting an
importation patent that the invention has “a generally beneficial impact.” EDUARD STOLLE, DIE
EINHEIMISCHE UND AUSLÄNDISCHE PATENTGESETZGEBUNG ZUM SHUTZE GEWERBLICHER
ERFINDUNGEN 27 (1855).
32. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
33. Some national laws continued to show the countries’ preference for local manufacturing.
See, e.g., Patents Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 87, § 37 (UK) (allowing for a compulsory license,
i.e. when the demand for a patented invention was met only through importation); see also infra notes
82–86, 97, 98 and accompanying text for developments in the United Kingdom, India, and Brazil.
34. THOMAS WEBSTER, CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES BREVETS D’INVENTION TENU À
L’EXPOSITION UNIVERSELLE DE VIENNE EN 1873 58–61 (1877).
35. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 51–52.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Paris Convention art. 5(A)(2), 1883.
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(a party to the Paris Convention);39 however, the Convention did not address the
question whether importation satisfied national working requirements.
The acknowledgment in the Paris Convention of the existence of national
working requirements was not without its opponents; even before the Convention
was signed in 1883, four countries opposed the provision.40 A few countries sought
to enlarge the territorial scope of the working that was required: at the 1886 Rome
Conference, Belgium and Italy proposed that a working in one of the countries of
the Paris Union should satisfy any working requirements that the national laws of
any of the countries imposed,41 and at the 1890 Madrid Conference, the United
States again introduced the proposal.42 Other countries advanced their own visions
for amendments to the Convention with regard to working requirements. France,
which at the time did not permit its working requirement to be satisfied by
importation, proposed in 1886 that the Convention be amended to allow countries
to prohibit importation.43 At the 1890 Madrid Conference, Sweden and Norway
proposed that compulsory licensing be introduced as the remedy for nonworking.44
Ultimately, in the Final Protocol to the 1900 Brussels Revision of the Convention,
the signatory countries agreed that a forfeiture for nonworking could not occur
before three years from the filing of a patent application and could occur only if a
patent owner could not justify the nonworking.45
By the beginning of the twentieth century, working requirements were perhaps
the most contentious issue of international patent law negotiations. While some
countries seemed at that time to be relaxing their working requirements, the United
Kingdom tightened its working requirement in 1902 by allowing the revocation of
a patent for nonworking not only if “[t]he patent [was] not being worked in the
United Kingdom,”46 but also “[i]f . . . the patent [was] worked . . . exclusively or
mainly, outside the United Kingdom,”47 and a 1907 amendment simplified the
procedure for the revocation of a patent.48 The amendments attracted harsh
39. Paris Convention art. 5(A)(1), 1883.
40. The countries were Belgium, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Turkey. PENROSE, supra
note 2, at 79; LADAS, supra note 1, at 519.
41. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 79–81.
42. Id. at 81.
43. Id. at 76.
44. Id. at 81.
45. Paris Convention, as revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1990.
46. Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, 46 & 47 VICT. c. 57 § 22(a).
47. Patents Act, 1902, 2 Edw. 7 c. 34 art. 3 (amending § 22(5) of the Patents, Designs, and Trade
Marks Act, 1883) (emphasis added); see Marks & Clerk, ATTORNEY’S MANUAL ON BRITISH AND
FOREIGN PATENTS AND TRADE MARKS 14–416 (1910) (providing additional information about
Patents Act, 1902).
48. A commentator in 1908 estimated that “[p]ossibly, because of the cheaper procedure under
the present [1907] Act and the new grounds upon which the reasonable requirements of the public are
to be deemed not to have been satisfied, applications for compulsory licenses may be more frequent in
the future than they have been in the past.” ROBERT FROST, PATENTS AND DESIGNS ACT, 1907: 7
EDW. 7, C. 29. WITH AN APPENDIX OF THE RULES, FORMS, FEES, AND CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS
UNDER THE ACT, TOGETHER WITH THE PATENTS AND DESIGNS (AMENDMENT ) ACT, 1907, AND
EXTRACTS FROM THE INTERPRETATION ACT, 1899 43 (3d ed. 1908).
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criticism.49 One contemporary commentator charged that “[t]he 1907 Act
fundamentally altered the nature of the modern British patent and threw it back into
the legal condition of British patents as granted by Elizabeth and the Stuarts.”50
The adoption of the 1902 and 1907 British statutes was prompted primarily
by concerns about the influence of the German chemical industry in the United
Kingdom and its monopolization of an entire industrial sector in the United
Kingdom.51 In a 1904 judgment in a case concerning chemical inventions, a
judge of the High Court of Justice rejected the notion that the nonworking of a
U.K. patent in the United Kingdom could lead to the revocation of a patent.52 The
judge suggested that the arguments presented by the defendant in the case would
have been “more properly . . . adduced in another place where the law may be
made.”53 When Parliament later debated the 1907 amendment to the Patents Act
concerning working requirements, members of Parliament noticed that almost half
of British patents issued in 1906 were granted to foreigners.54
The 1902 and 1907 amendments did not produce the desired results.
Applications for patent revocations were indeed filed under the 1907 law, but the
applications did not bring the effect on German chemical companies that the
amendments intended.55 The U.K. law prompted German companies to purchase
chemical plants in the United Kingdom, and the companies did not suffer mass
revocations of their U.K. chemical patents.56 An unintended result was that in
response to the U.K. approach, Germany amended its own patent working
requirement in 1911; instead of the revocation of a patent only in a case of
nonworking (which the law had provided for since 1877),57 the newly worded
provision adopted the wording of the U.K. Patents Act, imposing revocation if the
“invention [was] worked exclusively or primarily outside of the German
Reich . . . .”58
49. Patents and Designs Act, 1907, 7 Edw. c. 29 § 24.
50. LUNGE, supra note 18, at 28.
51. KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE: REASSERTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 232–33 (Leonardo
Burlamaqui et al. eds., 2014).
52. Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. W. G. Thompson & Co., Ld. [1904] EWHC (Eng.),
reprinted in REPORTS OF PATENT, DESIGN AND TRADEMARK CASES 21(20), 473, 479 (Intellectual
Prop. Office 1904).
53. Id.
54. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 140. In 1906, a total of 14,707 U.K. patents were granted, of
which 6,503 were granted to foreigners; of that latter number, 2,091 were granted to German applicants.
MARKS & CLERK, ATTORNEY’S MANUAL ON BRITISH AND FOREIGN PATENTS AND TRADE MARKS
17 (1910).
55. In 1909, the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks reported that 55
applications were filed that year for “the revocation of patents worked exclusively or mainly outside
the United Kingdom.” REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE
MARKS 9 (1909). According to the statistics from that year, 27 applications were “subsequently
abandoned” and 11 applications resulted in the revocation of the patent. Id.
56. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 693, 696, 600.
57. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], May 25, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL] at § 184
(Ger.).
58. Patent Act, 1911, Article 11(2) (emphasis added).
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The German chemical industry lobbied heavily for a complete abolition of
working requirements both in Germany and abroad. The industry sought to
eliminate working requirements in Germany, and Germany, in an attempt to
mitigate the impact of the requirements in other countries, concluded a series of
bilateral treaties with the United States, Greece, Switzerland, and Austria.59 These
treaties enlarged the territorial scope of patent working that would satisfy national
working requirements; for example, a 1909 agreement between Germany and the
United States stated that “[t]he working of a patent . . . in the territory of one of the
Contracting Parties shall be considered as equivalent to its working in the territory
of the other Party.”60 This agreement was concluded at a time when the percentage
of U.S. patents granted to foreign applicants, and in particular to German applicants,
was rising. Of the U.S. patents issued in 1900–1910, 11.3% were granted to foreign
applicants, and of those, 25% were granted to German applicants.61 In 1910–1915,
the latter percentage rose to 33%, and most of the German applicants were in the
chemical industry.62 Most importantly, in cases of certain types of chemical
inventions, German companies owned more than 90% of the patents issued on
those types of inventions.63
During the 1911 Washington Conference, Germany and the United States
both argued in favor of abolishing working requirements.64 However, the idea of a
complete abolition of the requirement did not enjoy sufficient support among the
other national delegations; the 1911 revision of the Convention restated the 1900
Final Protocol rule that working requirements could result in forfeiture only after
three years from the date of the filing of the patent application, and only then in the
absence of a justification that would excuse a nonworking.65
During the 1925 Hague Conference, only three countries opposed
the abolishment of the working requirement.66 The resulting Convention
text recognized countries’ rights “to take necessary legislative measures to
prevent . . . abuses” of patent rights, with “failure to work” being listed as the only
example of such abuses.67 The text also expressed a preference for compulsory
licensing as opposed to forfeiture, as long as a compulsory license would suffice to

59. JAN VOJÁČEK, A SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS 63 (1936); e.g.,
Übereinkomment zwischen der Schweiz und Deutschland betreffend den gegenseitigen Patent-,
Muster- und Markenschutz [Agreement between Switzerland and Germany concerning the mutual
protection of patents, designs and trademarks] [Switz-Ger.], Apr. 13, 1892, RGBL at art. 5 (Ger.);
Patents Convention, U.S-Ger., at 1:578, Feb. 23, 1909, 36 Stat. 2178 [hereinafter Patents Convention].
60. Patents Convention, supra note 59.
61. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 697.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 82.
65. Paris Convention, as revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, art. 5(A)(2), 1911.
66. The countries were Japan, Poland, and Yugoslavia. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 84.
67. Paris Convention, as revised at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, art. 5(A)(2); see also PIRES DE
CARVALHO, supra note 8, at 163 (critiquing proposals to declare non-working an instance of patent
abuse).
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prevent abuses of patent rights,68 and the text maintained in the Convention the
three-year period and justification through legitimate excuse.69
The 1934 London Conference added a provision stating that the “proceedings
for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration
of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license.”70 The 1958 Lisbon
Conference set a period after which a compulsory license may be requested to “four
years from the filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the
grant of the patent, whichever period last expires.”71 The 1958 text also specified
that the compulsory license would be non-exclusive and non-transferrable.72 The
1958 language concerning patent working requirements remains the current
language of the Convention. The 1967 Stockholm Conference extended the
applicability of the provisions concerning working requirements to utility models
but other than this extension introduced no changes to the provisions concerning
working requirements.73
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, developing countries pursued a proposal to
amend the provisions of the Convention with regard to working requirements; the
proposal would have allowed stricter national working requirements.74 Their
proposal included a provision according to which importation would not satisfy the
working requirement,75 and a provision allowing sanctions other than compulsory
licenses to be imposed for nonworking.76 The proposal would have also allowed
developing countries to shorten the period for revoking a patent for nonworking77
and to issue exclusive compulsory licenses.78 The parties to the Convention
contested the proposal,79 and the disagreement over the proposal was one of the
reasons that this revision of the Convention was not adopted.80
In 1992, the working requirements of two European countries, Italy and the
United Kingdom, were subject to scrutiny by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities when the Court assessed the compatibility of their working

68. Paris Convention, as revised at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, art. 5(A)(3).
69. Paris Convention, as revised at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, art. 5(A)(4).
70. Paris Convention, as revised at London on June 2, 1934, art. 5(A)(4).
71. Paris Convention, as revised at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958, art. 5A(4).
72. Id.
73. Paris Convention, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, art. 5(A)(5).
74. Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 1, at 234.
75. Draft Text of Basic Proposal for Paris Convention art. 5A(1)(b), reprinted in Paul S. Haar,
Revision of the Paris Convention: A Realignment of Private and Public Interests in the International Patent
System, 8 BROOK. J. INT ’ L L. 77, 107 (1982) [hereinafter Draft Text].
76. Id. at art. 5(A)(1).
77. Adrienne Catanese, Paris Convention, Patent Protection, and Technology Transfer, 3 B.U. INT ’ L
L. J. 209, 221 (1985).
78. Id. at 219.
79. Id. at 218–22.
80. Id. at 218; see Fenton Hay, Canada’s Role in International Negotiations Concerning Intellectual
Property Laws, 8 RES. IN L. AND ECON. 239, 251–56 (providing a detailed description of the eight-year
negotiations, including the Nairobi Session).
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requirements with European Economic Community law.81 The Commission of the
European Communities had brought the first of the two cases against Italy in 1989
and the second case against the United Kingdom in 1990, claiming that the Italian
and U.K. working requirements82 violated Article 30 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community,83 which prohibited (and which the equivalent
current provision in the European Union still prohibits) “[q]uantitative restrictions
on importation and all measures with equivalent effect.”84 The Court of Justice held
that the working requirement in the Italian and U.K. patent statutes violated Article
30;85 the Court rejected arguments put forth in defense of the requirements,
including the argument that “the objection to the provisions in question [was]
essentially academic since in practice they [were] seldom applied.”86
Indeed, the incidence of enforcement of patent working requirements has
typically been reported as low. This low incidence might exist for two reasons: First,
patents that are economically valuable—patents that are of sufficient economic
importance to warrant an attack by competitors for nonworking—are typically not
the patents that are not worked, and if valuable patents are not worked, the reason
for the nonworking might often excuse the nonworking. Second, many countries
have accepted nominal working as sufficient to satisfy the requirement; for example,
in some countries, isolated advertisements were found to satisfy the requirement
when those advertisements were placed in industry magazines and the
advertisements offered to grant licenses to anyone interested.87 The voluntary
“license of right” mechanism introduced in some countries helps patent owners
comply with the working requirement;88 a patent owner may request that its patent
be designated as “license of right,” meaning that the patent is available to anyone
by license, and such a designation protects the patent owner from being attacked
for nonworking.89

81. See Case C-235/89, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 1992 E.C.R. I-777; Case C-30/90, Comm’n
v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829.
82. Royal Decree No. 1127 of 29 June 1939, as amended by Decree No. 849 of 26 February
1968, art. 52; U.K. Patents Act, 1977, s. 48.
83. See Case C-235/89, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 1992 E.C.R. I-777; Case C-30/90, Comm’n
v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829.
84. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 34, 298
U.N.T.S. 11; see also Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, 1973.
85. See Case C-235/89, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 1992 E.C.R. I-777; Case C-30/90, Comm’n
v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829.
86. Comm’n v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829 at ¶ 15; see Mark Hodgson, Changes to UK Compulsory
Patent Licensing Laws, 14(6) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 214 (1992) (illustrating developments leading
to the case against the United Kingdom).
87. PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 98:17 (Henry D. Teegarden ed., 4th ed. 2015).
88. See infra note 160; Patents Act 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87 § 37 (UK) (demonstrating
that involuntary mechanisms described as “licenses of right” may also exist); see also Robert Miller,
TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS ch. 17 §§ 17-23 (17th ed. 2010) (providing commentary on
involuntary “licenses of right” in the United Kingdom).
89. See infra note 166.
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The TRIPS Agreement does not include provisions that specifically address
working requirements,90 but some commentators have suggested that some of its
provisions do affect working requirements, specifically, the provisions that prohibit
discrimination based on the place of invention and based on whether the invention
is manufactured locally or is imported.91 Some commentators have argued that
patent working requirements violate the TRIPS Agreement;92 other commentators
have inferred from the Agreement that countries must accept importation as
satisfying the working requirement.93 No binding interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement exists that would shed light on the status of working requirements postTRIPS. The single WTO dispute that concerned the requirements—a dispute
between the United States and Brazil—settled without producing a binding
opinion.94
Many countries today maintain a patent working requirement in some form.95
Countries typically accept importation as a form of patent working. In India, the
question of importation was recently before its courts, and the Mumbai Controller
of Patents—in a decision concerning a compulsory license on a pharmaceutical
patent—stated in 2012 that “the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement and
[Indian] Patents Act, 1970 read together do not in any manner imply that working
means importation.”96 However, this interpretation was rejected on appeal by the
Intellectual Property Appellate Board in 2013, and the High Court of Judicature in
the same year confirmed that “worked in India” does not have to “mean only
manufactured in India.”97 In fact, the “patented invention [may] be worked in the
90. For the history of the TRIPS negotiations with respect to working requirements, see Paul
Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An
Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT ’ L L. 365, 373–80 (2002).
91. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7 at art. 27(1).
92.
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 43 (Oxford
2012).
93. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 433
(4th ed. 2012); PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 8, at 81, 317. Cf. Cottier et al., supra note 1, at 460. For
arguments that working requirements are in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, see Michael
Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at
International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 282 (1997); Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty
Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working
Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT ’ L L. 275, 275-76, 326 (2010); Champ & Attaran, supra note 90, at 367,
393; DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 92, at 43–45.
94. World Trade Organization, Brazil–Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Doc. WT/
DS199/4, June 19, 2001. For a discussion of the aftermath of the dispute, see Monirul Azam, The
Experiences of TRIPS-Compliant Patent Law Reforms in Brazil, India, and South Africa and Lessons for
Bangladesh, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 61, 69–70 (2014).
95. Cottier et al., supra note 1.
96. CONTROLLER OF PATENTS MUMBAI, In re Application for Compulsory License Under Section
84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 in Respect of Patent No. 215758, Application No. 1 of 2011 44–45 (Mar.
9, 2012), http://www.hkindia.com/images/compulsory.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NRH-ZK7A].
97. Bayer v. Union of India [High Court of Judicature at Bombay] Writ Petition No. 1323 of
2013 ( July 15, 2014), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28519340/ [https://perma.cc/5KSWZ6YB]. The decision of the Controller (the compulsory license) was upheld, and the Supreme Court
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territory of India by manufacture or otherwise.”98 Article 68 of the Brazilian Patent
Act that the United States challenged before the WTO does not recognize
importation as a form of working; the Act permits others to import the invention
into Brazil if the patent owner only imports the invention into Brazil, but does not
manufacture it in there.99
II. GOALS OF WORKING REQUIREMENTS
As the historical overview above suggests, patent working requirements were
designed to accomplish various goals in different countries at different times. All of
these goals can be subsumed under a single heading: “access.” All of the goals strive
to provide access to a desired commodity—an entire field of technology, a skill,
information about an invention, and/or a patented invention itself—in the country
that granted the patent. What has changed throughout the decades is what the
particular commodities are that countries consider desirable and what actions have
been considered necessary to achieve effective access to the commodities.
Inevitably, particular circumstances and needs in individual countries have shaped
the specific goals that the countries pursue with their working requirements.
In the earliest days of patents, countries wanted to attract foreign artisans who
possessed skills and knowledge that were not available to the local population; these
foreign artisans were expected to teach their art locally.100 The function of the patent
holder as a “teacher of the nation”101 was reflected in the patent term, which was
based on a typical seven-year apprenticeship term.102 During this stage of
development, it would have been ineffective for countries to rely on the other types
of disclosures that the later patent systems introduced in the form of claims,
descriptions, and specifications because even a detailed written disclosure would
have been insufficient to enable anyone in the country to practice the disclosed
invention without being taught the basics of the art by the patent holder. The
imported art required new types of skills completely unknown to the local
population.103
The patents that were originally granted by countries introduced an entire or
substantial part of a field of industry to a country,104 helped develop the skills and

of India dismissed the special leave petition in the case. Bayer v. Union of India [Supreme Court of
India] petition for special leave to appeal No. 30145/2014 (Dec. 12, 2014).
98. Id. (emphasis added); see also Emmanuel Kolawole Oke, Can Importation Satisfy Local
Working Requirements?, 37(5) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 278 (2015).
99. Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996, Article 68(3) & (4) (Braz.).
100. See LUNGE, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
101. FELIX DAMME, DAS DEUTSCHE PATENTRECHT 8 (1906).
102. Id.
103. Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge, 45 TECH. &
CULTURE 569, 578 (2004) (“[P]atents were mainly used to reward craftsmen who introduced processes
or products unknown in the local context and who, for precisely that reason, rarely entered into conflict
with the city craft guilds.”).
104. Id. at 570–71, 588–89.
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knowledge of the local population,105 and produced local benefits even after the
patent holder had left the country or otherwise ceased to practice the patent.106 Mere
importation of a patented invention would not have produced all these benefits,
and compulsory licensing would have been an insufficient penalty for nonworking
because there would have been no one in the country to practice the invention,
unless there was a competing foreign artisan present. Revocation of the patent
under the old patent systems allowed for the possibility of granting the patent to
someone else who could utilize and benefit from the monopoly. After the modern
patent systems for inventions made novelty an explicit requirement, revocation of
the patent could not be followed by a new patent grant on the same invention, but
the revocation would lower the cost of entry into the market to attract persons who
could then practice the invention in the country.107
Modern patent systems replaced the working of a patent for the purposes of
transfer of information with other forms of disclosure that were sufficient to meet
the informational goal.108 In the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century, “the
requirement of compulsory working dropped into desuetude and its place was taken
for all practical purposes, in particular in the practice of the law courts, by . . . [the
full disclosure] requirement.”109 Disclosure through actual working became less
important for two reasons. First, patents began to be granted on inventions that did
not represent an entirely new area of art;110 the inventions were incremental
additions to existing art that was already developed in the country or that could have
been developed based on knowledge already available in the country. Therefore, a
detailed disclosure in a patent application became sufficient for teaching the
invention to local industry. Second, patent systems developed sufficiently detailed
requirements for the content of patent applications so that the applications
sufficiently disclosed (or should have sufficiently disclosed) the information
necessary for relevant persons to learn the invention.111
Even after the modern patent systems changed to paper disclosure, remnants
of working requirements sometimes remained and contributed to the sufficiency of

105. Id.; see also LUNGE, supra note 18, at 3.
106. Id.
107. See LUNGE, supra note 18, at 27.
108. As Herbert Hovenkamp points out, the fact that disclosure was secured through other
means did not render working requirements superfluous from the perspective of other goals: “Patent
disclosure and enablement are intended to facilitate copying of the innovation by others after a patent
expires. Nonuse during the patent period can still result in removal of the technology from the market
for the duration of the patent’s life.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent
Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 22 (2016).
109. LUNGE, supra note 18, at 14; see also PENROSE, supra note 2, at 138; Mario Biagioli, Patent
Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights and Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1135 (2006)
(“What changed radically between 1594 and 1790 were not just the standards of patent descriptions but
what those descriptions were for.”).
110. LUNGE, supra note 18, at 15–16.
111. Id. at 16–17.
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disclosure. In the United States, the requirements of enablement and best mode112
evidenced a desire for patent applicants to disclose information important for the
actual working of their patents.113 The actual working of an invention is one of the
possible means of reduction to practice.114 The reduction to practice may mark the
moment of invention, which for patent applications filed before the effective date
of the America Invents Act115 constituted the priority date of inventions.116
From an informational goal perspective, working requirements have also
become less important because of the greater accessibility of patent applications
published abroad. When cross-border exchanges of information were limited, local
patent working was a means of learning about an invention that might have been
available and/or described elsewhere but would have been de facto nonexistent for
the local population, who could not access the information about the invention.
Once sufficient disclosure exists in a country, or once information is accessible from
other countries, the pressure for a working requirement diminishes to the extent
that “the disclosure and information functions of the patent system [may be] . . .
covered through the patent systems of the more technically advanced countries.”117
Working requirements, when they required local manufacture, were designed
to support the development of domestic industry. To satisfy the requirement, a
patent owner had to build its own manufacturing capacity in the country, utilize
existing capacity in the country, or license its invention to someone who could
manufacture the invention locally. The requirement that the patented invention be
manufactured in the country was also designed to positively impact employment in
the country, since local workers would likely be employed to work the invention. A
skilled labor force and a manufacturing capacity would be the legacy of the patent
working that would benefit the country long after the patent had expired.
The local manufacture rationale for working requirements remains valid in
developing and least-developed countries. These countries are being asked to
harmonize their patent laws with international standards in line with the theory that
stronger patent protection in these countries will enhance the transfer of technology

112. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); ROBERT A. CLARKE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 2100, § 2165 (9th ed. 2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2165.html.
113. See Hovenkamp, supra note 108, at 21–22.
114. CLARKE, supra note 112, § 2138.05 (9th ed. 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/s2138.html#d0e207753 [https://perma.cc/LQ67-4G24] (“For an actual reduction to
practice, the invention must have been sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for its
intended purpose, but it need not be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development.” (citation
omitted)).
115. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2011)) (changing the U.S. patent system to first-to-file as of Mar. 16,
2013).
116. For a proposal suggesting that an actual reduction to practice be required, see Christopher
A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 120–22 (2009).
117. Guillermo Cabanellas, The Consequences of Stricter Working Requirements for Patentees
Under the Paris Convention, 19 I.I.C. 158, 162 (1988).
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and know-how into these countries.118 However, such transfers will occur only if
patented inventions are manufactured inside the country; importation alone will do
little, if anything, to bring about any technology or know-how transfers.119 There
are, of course, many reasons why patent owners might opt not to manufacture in a
particular country—availability of patent protection is only one factor that patent
owners might consider.120 But if a potential patent applicant plans to manufacture
in a country, there seems to be no reason why the existence of a working
requirement predicated on local manufacture should dissuade the applicant from
applying for a patent and manufacturing in the country. If it is impossible, or if it
makes no economic sense to manufacture in a country, presumably no one—
whether a patent owner or a competitor—will want to manufacture the invention
in the country. In that case, even if a patent exists on the invention in the country,
it is highly unlikely that anyone would challenge the nonworking of the patent,
unless the patent owner only imports the patented invention into the country and
uses the patent solely as an “exclusive import permit”121 that other potential
importers will want to challenge.
An important goal of the working requirement has been to secure access to a
patented invention in the country that granted the patent, regardless of whether the
invention is manufactured in the country or elsewhere.122 The goal has been not
only for the population to be able to learn about the invention but also—or even
primarily—for the population to benefit from the use of the invention. For
example, countries want patented pharmaceutical inventions to be available locally
during the patent term but do not necessarily want to develop their own
pharmaceutical industries.123 The goal of securing access to the patented invention
solely for the purposes of use may outweigh the other goals of the working
requirement, such as the development of a domestic industry, with the result that
importation will be a sufficient form of the working requirement to satisfy this
particular goal. A country may also relinquish the prospect of local manufacturing

118. Ashish Arora, Intellectual Property Rights and the International Transfer of Technology: Setting
Out an Agenda for Empirical Research in Developing Countries, in THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 41, 41 (2009).
119. Edith Penrose, International Patenting and the Less-Developed Countries, 83 ECON. J. 768,
770 (1973). Penrose also noted that “very few of the foreign patents granted in less-developed countries
are actually worked in the country granting them . . . . [I]t is often concluded that foreign patents serve
primarily as exclusive import permits for the foreign producers.” Id. at 776.
120. For the “reasons why a patentee may decide not to exploit its patent within a given
country,” see Cabanellas, supra note 117, at 166–68. For historical examples of patent owners’ attraction
to existing technology in a country of a patent, see Belfanti, supra note 103, at 581.
121. See Penrose, supra note 119, at 776; see also Haar, supra note 75, at 93 (noting in Nairobi
negotiations, least-developed countries “[p]erceive[d] nominal working as an effective transformation
of patent grants into import permits impeding the transfer of technology and forestalling domestic
research.” (footnote omitted)).
122. See Halewood, supra note 93, at 246.
123. Id. at 248.
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if local manufacturing would result in higher prices for—and therefore de facto less
access to—the patented invention in the country.124
Another goal of patent working requirements is to prevent patent owners from
creating blocking monopolies—from obtaining and maintaining patents for the
purpose of blocking others from developing technologies in the vicinity of the
patented inventions.125 In these instances a country already has its own industry that
can secure access to inventions in the invention’s vicinity. However, the patent
owner holds a key to the future development of the field of technology in the
particular area. The problem could be created by a single patent owner, a patent
pool, or otherwise linked patent owners who could effectively monopolize an area
of technology and block access to the technology, thereby stifling the development
of that technology in the country.126 An imposition of either forfeiture or
compulsory licensing in a case of nonworking will result in the unblocking of access
to the patented invention. Relying on patent owners to agree to the need to crosslicense complementary patents127 works only if competitors actually own
complementary patents that the blocking patent owners need.
Strategic considerations concerning the preservation or development of a
certain field of technology might also influence countries’ approaches to patent
working requirements. It was a concern about the development of the domestic
chemical industry in the United Kingdom that led at the beginning of the twentieth
century to the tightening of the patent working requirement in the United Kingdom
at a time the U.K. government felt that German companies had begun to
monopolize the U.K. chemical industry.128 A danger of monopolization might arise
even if a technology is actually being developed in a country and there is no formal
violation of a working requirement, but all of the industry is in the hands of a single
set of companies or a set of linked companies—whether they be linked
administratively, economically, politically, or otherwise. If the entirety of an industry
is being developed in the country by a group of companies that collectively blocks
or may block competitors and alternative industries, the country may be vulnerable,
particularly in strategic industries.129

124. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT ’ L L. 317 (2005).
125. These may be dependent patents. See Richard Reik, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, 36
AM. ECON. REV. 813, 816–17 (1946).
126. For examples of suppression of technology through patent non-use, see Kurt M. Saunders,
Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 389, 406–17 (2002). For rationales that might lead to suppression through patent non-use, see
id. at 417–26.
127. Cabanellas, supra note 117, at 168.
128. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
129. The Nairobi proposal from the 1980s for amending article 5(A) of the Paris Convention
seemed to have targeted such circumstances; paragraph 5 of Article 5A would have allowed countries
to expropriate patents—even if those patents were worked by their patent owners—if the expropriation
was in the public interest. Haar, supra note 75, at 95. The proposed definition of “public interest”
included “the development of other vital sectors of the national economy.” Id. at 96 (footnote omitted).
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III. INTERACTION WITH OTHER COMPONENTS
OF NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
Patent working requirements are components of complex national legal
systems and do not operate in isolation from the other components of the system;
they interact with the other components, and the requirements are shaped in part
by the needs of the entire system. This Section explores the links and interactions
between working requirements and the other components of the system.
As was noted above, patent working requirements interact with the
requirement of disclosure. In the early days of patents, “requiring actual assembly
in the country[ ] help[ed] those in the industry better understand the product’s
unique features.”130 History suggests that the more detailed is the requirement of
sufficient disclosure in a patent application, the less is the need for a working
requirement. Sufficient disclosure should satisfy the need for information about the
invention, so that there is no need for addressees to actually witness the
functioning—or at least the finished assembly—of the invention.131 As was
suggested earlier, even with sufficient disclosure on paper, some remnants of the
working requirements might survive in patent systems today to enhance disclosure.
However, there should be no need to see an invention worked before or while it is
patented in order for anyone ordinarily skilled in the art and equipped with
sufficient infrastructure to be able to replicate the invention.
Several commentators have noted that the current disclosure rules do not
serve the purpose of sufficiently informing persons ordinarily skilled in the art about
an invention.132 They argue that first, the high numbers of patents make the tracking
of all patents in a particular field of technology impossible; since some areas of
technology are overcrowded with patents, identifying patents of potential relevance
is extremely difficult.133 Second, paper disclosure in some technologies, such as
biotechnology and modern pharmaceuticals, does not enable third parties to
replicate the invention “disclosed” in the patent application.134 A working
requirement could help the patent overcrowding problem, at least to the extent that
patent systems might provide stronger protection to patent owners who work their
patents. For some inventions, a working of the invention might still be an important
vehicle for effective disclosure.135
130. Fauver, supra note 4, at 673.
131. Reik, supra note 125, at 813 (“Authoritative German experts admit[ted] that, in order to
understand the essence . . . of the invention described in a German patent specification, it [was] often
necessary to consult with the corresponding United States or British specifications.”).
132. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 563 (2009).
133. Id. at 585.
134. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admission
that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 10 (2006); Mark J. Stewart, The Written
Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the University of
California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537, 549–50 (1999).
135. See Cotropia, supra note 116, at 123 (“An actual reduction to practice requirement would
generate more technical information about the invention.”); DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 92,
at 43–44.
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Another important relationship exists between working requirements and the
rules of patentability. If a country is concerned about any actual or potential access
problems caused by a certain type of patents, then limiting or eliminating those
patents altogether by excluding those inventions from patentability makes a working
requirement logically unnecessary. This somewhat mundane point is important
from a historical perspective: before TRIPS, countries were less likely to push for
working requirements if they were able to avoid granting patents on certain
inventions by excluding the inventions from patentability.
At the time that the United Kingdom was concerned about the expansion of
the German chemical industry, a number of countries did not grant patents for
chemical inventions at all. For example, the Swiss chemical industry was a strong
opponent of patent protection for chemical processes in Switzerland in the 1860s–
1880s, and when a patent statute was finally adopted in Switzerland in 1887 it
excluded chemical processes from patentability.136 This opposition was directed at
the German chemical industry and continued until 1907.137 Following the
experience of the Allies during WWII when German ownership of chemical patents
caused significant problems with access to chemicals in the United States, one U.S.
commentator in 1946 suggested that “the barring of chemical substances in
particular from being patented as products, appear[ed] to be a desirable change in
the United States patent laws.”138
Not until the signing of the TRIPS Agreement was an international agreement
concluded on rules concerning patentable subject matter;139 before TRIPS, the Paris
Convention conferences could not agree on a list of protectable inventions.140
Notwithstanding the high degree of harmonization of patentable subject matter in
TRIPS, countries continue to enjoy some leeway with regard to patentability. Apart
from the areas where TRIPS provides for possible exclusions,141 and apart from
computer programs for which interpretations have resulted in differences in
patentability,142 countries have found ways to limit the patentability of inventions
when a country has had concerns about access. For example, the Indian Supreme
Court affirmed an enhanced efficacy requirement for patents in India—a

136. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 16, 124.
137. Id.
138. Reik, supra note 125, at 823 (“What [the author is] actually intending to emphasize here is
that, however one may wish to proceed in the matter of those exceptions, the patent law reform should
give priority to the compulsory licensing legislation.”).
139. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994;
TRIPS Agreement, Annex 1C, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
140. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 54.
141. TRIPS Agreement arts. 27(2)–(3); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); D’Acry v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2015] HCA 35 (Austl.); D’Arcy
v Myriad Genetics, Inc. [2014] FCR 115 (Austl.).
142. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014); European Patent
Office Enlarged Board of Appeal, Opinion G 3/08, May 12, 2010, par. 10.13.
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requirement that is arguably directed primarily at pharmaceutical patents.143 As well,
the allegedly increased Canadian requirement of utility that has been confirmed by
the Canadian courts has precluded patents on some inventions in Canada, and this
approach has affected pharmaceutical inventions more than other types of
inventions.144
If countries can effectively limit or eliminate patents on inventions of national
strategic importance, their need for working requirements substantially decreases or
fades entirely. Such an elimination or limitation of patent protection for certain
inventions, however, might negatively affect a country’s access to certain inventions
if inventors do not invent at all, and/or access to information about certain
inventions if inventors choose not to disclose information about their inventions in
instances when such information can be kept secret because the invention cannot
be easily reverse engineered.
International negotiations have also failed to reach a consensus on rules for
the exhaustion of patent rights; TRIPS left open an option for countries to choose
their adherence to the principle of either national or international exhaustion of
intellectual property rights, such as patent rights.145 For countries that are concerned
solely with access to patented products and have no desire to promote their own
industries, international exhaustion may serve their needs, at least partially: even if
a patent owner does not manufacture or import his product into the country, the
country has access to the product if third persons can purchase the product abroad
and import the product into the country without violating the country’s patent law.
In such a case, a country that has adopted the principle of international exhaustion,
but needs only access to a patented product, might not need to adopt a working
requirement. To the extent that the country is concerned about patent owners
blocking access to the invention globally, however, working requirements might
need to be introduced in the country to complement the principle of international
exhaustion.
Provisions on working requirements will not be as important, if they are
important at all, in countries where a patent owner’s working or nonworking of a
patent is reflected in decisions to grant or deny an injunction to prevent third
persons from working the invention. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the
143. Novartis AG v. Union of India [Supreme Court of India] Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716,
par. 103 (2013). On the allegedly heightened novelty standard for pharmaceuticals in Brazil, see
Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial Bases of
Health Policies, 42 COMP. POL. 41, 46 (2009).
144. See Eli Lilly v. Government of Canada, Notice of Arbitration, Sept. 12, 2013 (arguing that
the utility requirement, as applied, causes Canada to be in violation of Article 1709(1) of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement).
145. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 6, Jan. 1, 1995.
Under the principle of national exhaustion, patent rights in the country exhaust only through the first
sale of the patented product within the country by the patent owner or with his consent. Id. Under the
principle of international exhaustion, the first sale of the patented product anywhere in the world by
the patent owner or with his consent exhausts the patent rights within the country that adopted the rule
of international exhaustion. Id.
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proposition that the nonworking of a patent, taken alone, may justify a denial of
injunctive relief.146 The Court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that
nonworking will be considered as one factor to be weighed when deciding whether
to grant injunctive relief.147 In the particular case before the Court the patent owner
was in fact open to licensing the patented invention;148 in other cases involving
complete nonworking in the sense of blocking access to an invention, the fact of
nonworking could receive more weight in a court’s analysis. The public interest in
such cases may outweigh other factors.149
If a court denies an injunction, it de facto grants a compulsory license on the
patent,150 a result that is equivalent to the enforcement of a working requirement.
In countries where courts have no discretion and must grant injunctive relief in
patent infringement cases, a patent working requirement might be needed to address
a situation for which the law in the country otherwise provides no remedy. For
example, under German law, though courts do enjoy a certain degree of discretion
when deciding whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction,151 courts have no
discretion to grant or deny a permanent injunction. When a patent is presumed to
be valid152 and the patent has been infringed, a court must issue an injunction.153
146. eBay Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
147. Id. at 393–94; see also MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 571 (2007)
(“[A]lthough the Supreme Court rejected an analysis implying that a categorical exclusion prevented
injunctions from issuing if a patent holder did not practice its patents and existed only to license them,
the Court in no way suggested that such facts could not be considered as part of the calculus in weighing
the traditional equitable factors.”).
148. Id.
149. For an overview of older instances of decisions in which U.S. courts denied injunctions in
patent infringement cases, see A. Jason Mirabito, Compulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A
Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’ Y 404, 407–12 (1975).
150. HTC Corp. v. Nokia Corp. [2013] EWHC (Pat) 3778, [32] (Eng.); cf. Paice
L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313, 1313 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (where the court
distinguished between a grant of a compulsory license and the denial of an injunction combined with
the setting of an ongoing royalty). Judge Rader opined in his concurring opinion that “calling a
compulsory license an ‘ongoing royalty’ does not make it any less a compulsory license.” Id. at 1316
(Rader, J., concurring).
151. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 940, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html.
152. In Germany, “unless a trial court determines that there is a likelihood that a claim of patent
invalidity would be successful in a separate validity proceeding, the court adjudicates the infringement.
If a trial court finds that a claim of patent invalidity is likely to succeed, it may stay its proceedings and
wait for a decision by the Federal Patent Court on the issue of validity.” Marketa Trimble, The
Extraterritorial Enforcement of Patent Rights, in PAT. ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE (Christopher Heath
ed., 2015); see ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 148.
153. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I
[BGBL. I], § 139(1); ZPO [Code of Civil Procedure], § 935, translation at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html. As opposed to German courts, for which the issuance of
permanent injunctions is automatic, the new courts that will be established in Europe under the
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court––including courts that will be established under the Agreement
in the territory of Germany––will have discretion to decide whether to grant or deny permanent
injunctions. Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, art. 63(1) (“[T]he Court may grant an injunction
against the infringer . . . .”) (emphasis added). The Agreement does not specify the factors that courts
may or should take into consideration when exercising their discretion.
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The remedy in German law for nonworking is a compulsory license, for which the
Patent Act expressly provides.154
Remedies for the nonworking of patents might also arise under competition
law, but only to the extent that the exercise of patent rights may be deemed in
violation of competition law rules,155 which require sufficient market power and
which typically apply only in cases of patents that are held to be standard-essential
patents.156 While all patents confer exclusive rights, standard-essential patents
confer true monopolies because it is impossible to design around these patents and
invent a new product that could successfully compete on the market in which the
patented invention has become the standard in the industry.157 When a patented
invention becomes a standard, competition law might provide an appropriate
remedy for the nonworking of the patent if the patent owner has consented to
license his patent to anyone who requests a license under fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.158 The availability of redress under
competition law renders less important any patent working requirement provisions
that exist, at least for the purposes of redressing the nonworking of standardessential patents.159
Patents that are not standard essential typically include no obligation for their
owners to license the patents, but the “license of right” mechanism may draw
patents that are not standard essential into a similar regime. The United Kingdom
introduced the “license of right” mechanism in 1919;160 the mechanism allows a
patent owner to “apply to the Comptroller to have [the] patent endorsed with the
words ‘license of right.’”161 The endorsement means that “any person is thereafter
entitled to a license under the patent as a matter of right. The terms of the license
may be settled by agreement of the parties . . . [or] the Comptroller [may settle the
license] on application by either party.”162 In Germany, the Patent Act of 1936
introduced a “license of right” that allows a patent owner to “declare to the Patent
Office . . . that he is prepared to allow anyone to use the invention in return for

154. PatG [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBL. I, at §§ 24(5), 85.
155. “[A]ntitrust law has not proved to be an effective weapon against unilateral patent
suppression.” Saunders, supra note 126, at 432. “Thus, antitrust law has played a collateral role in
deterring patent nonuse leading to technology suppression.” Id. at 434.
156. Id.
157. Alan Devlin, Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation, 67 FLA. L. REV. 775, 827
(2015).
158. Id. at 828; see also Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., CJEU, C-170/13, July 16,
2015.
159. For detailed discussions of the interface between competition/antitrust law and patent law
in the context of nonworking, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark Lemley, Unilateral
Refusals to License, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent
System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 468 (2015).
160. Patents and Designs Act 1919, § 24 (Eng.).
161. P.J. Federico, Compulsory Licensing in Other Countries, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295, 305
(1948).
162. Id.
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reasonable compensation.”163 Provisions for a “license of right” were eventually
introduced in other European countries, including France, Spain, and Italy,164 and
a “license of right” is also available for the new European patent with unitary
effect.165
A “license of right” thus creates an obligation similar to the obligation that
competition law creates for standard-essential patents, and patent owners are
obligated to license their patents. Therefore, the actual working of a “license of
right” patent is secured whether or not someone is willing to actually work the
patent—the “license of right” constitutes the working.166
CONCLUSION
A patent working requirement is a component of the patent laws in many
countries today. The history of the requirement reflects the development of the
different goals that countries’ patent systems have pursued at various points in
history. These goals shaped the variations of the requirement and explain the
positions that countries have held for the requirements over time. Perhaps it is a
testament to the rapid economic development and technological primacy of the
United States for a significant part of its history that its patent system included a
patent working requirement for only a brief time. Nevertheless, a desire to
encourage owners of U.S. patents to work their patents was not completely absent
from U.S. patent law and remains apparent in several components of the current
system.
The diverse goals pursued by different countries and the differences in their
national legal systems make the harmonizing of provisions on patent working
requirements difficult, particularly because there is an absence of both (1) an
agreement on a single goal or a set of goals that all countries want to pursue for all
technologies, and (2) an overall alignment of national legal systems. A developed
country with a broad manufacturing capacity might not need the same type of
working requirement that a developing country with nascent industries might need.
Or a country in which courts must grant injunctions in patent infringement cases
with no discretion otherwise might have to maintain a patent working requirement
to prevent nonworking, while another country might resolve the same issue partially

163. Ilja Rudyk, Three Essays on the Economics and Design of Patent Systems 1, 9 (2012)
(Ph.D. dissertation). On the original motivation for the provision in the German Patent Act, see id. at
12–13.
164. Id. at 14.
165. Council Regulation 1257/2012 of Dec. 17, 2012 (implementing enhanced cooperation in
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection).
166. For a proposal for a similar solution for U.S. patents, see Sichelman, supra note 6; Federico,
supra note 161, at 306 (in the United Kingdom “[f ]rom 1921 to 1939, the number of patents endorsed
[‘license of right’] averaged 690 per year, which is about 4 per cent of the average number of patents
granted each year.”); Rudyk, supra note 163, at 3 (in 2008 in Germany a “[l]icense of right has been
declared for more than 4,500 German patent applications,” meaning 6% of all German patent
applications). For detailed statistics on the use of “license of right” in Germany, see id. at 15–39.
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or completely by allowing court discretion in the granting of injunctions. As the
other components of legal systems must be, patent working requirements of
individual countries must be compared at a functional level within the context of
the legal system in which they operate.
Critics of patent working requirements often point to the fact that the
requirements are rarely enforced, meaning that that patents are rarely revoked and
compulsory licenses are rarely issued because of a failure to fulfill the
requirements.167 However, the incidences of enforcement of a component of a legal
system are a weak indicator of the efficacy of that component. Even without
enforcement actions, the mere existence of the component may guide and influence
behavior.
An analysis of the development of the patent working requirement at national
levels and in international negotiations raises important questions about methods
of international harmonization. International harmonization increasingly focuses on
specific wordings that should be adopted verbatim in national legislation, rather
than outlines of general guiding principles that should be implemented in national
legislation. This greater specificity might be prompted by a desire to improve the
global legal environment for businesses that could benefit from uniform national
laws, and the greater specificity might contribute to increased compliance with
international law when specific treaty provisions are directly applicable (selfexecuting) in jurisdictions that allow for the direct applicability of international
treaties. The resulting identical language in national laws can have the advantage of
contributing to further legal harmonization in agency and court interpretations,
rulings, and decisions. Conversely, greater specificity might make treaty
implementation more difficult if specific rules are inconsistent with the internal
consistency of a national legal system.
Some commentators suggest that international harmonization, including
harmonization that may affect patent working requirements, should be viewed from
an internationalist perspective—a perspective that considers the global welfare.168
As is representative for this view, Guillermo Cabanellas noted that “[t]he real world
is one where more than a hundred industrial property systems coexist and where
the consequences of one country’s laws bear not only on that country but also on
the rest of the countries of the world.”169 Unfortunately, the internationalist
perspective cannot maximize global welfare without an international coordination
of laws among countries. Until this coordination exists—if it ever does—and while
countries respect only the interests of their various local stakeholders, countries will
subordinate the idea of global welfare and continue to pursue only their own
interests. Patent working requirements should be tailored to ensure that countries
achieve their individual goals and meet the needs of their own legal systems.
167. E.g., Reik, supra note 125, at 815.
168. Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20
WIS. INT ’ L L.J. 523 (2001–2002).
169. Cabanellas, supra note 117, at 166.

